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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: This study hypothesizes that tax benefits encourage the use of third-party capital, 
and seeks to verify whether the tax benefit deriving from debts has a positive effect on 
Brazilian companies’ capital structure.  
Approach/Methodology/Design: Data on 259 nonfinancial companies over the period 2008-
2018 are extracted from the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database and are analyzed 
through regression with dynamic data panel. The variables considered as tax benefit proxies 
are: marginal tax rate, kink, standardized kink and tax payment.The investigations comprise: 
trade off theory, pecking order theory, information asymmetry, bankruptcy costs and agency 
theory.  
Findings: A positive debt effect on capital structure, taxation as providing a systematic 
incentive for greater leverage, and that, Brazilian companies, despite the country’s heavy tax 
burden, are not taken full advantage of debt tax benefits. The study offers new evidence as to 
the speed of adjusting the indebtedness level relating to an optimal capital structure target. 
Brazilian companies have ground to contract more debt and maximize their tax benefit. 
Practical Implications: The study will contribute positively to the understanding of influence 
of high tax emerging market for the government, academia, banks, industry, managers, 
regulators, investors and other users.  
Originality/value: This study innovates by using MTR, kink and standardized kink to find 
debt tax benefits affecting emerging market companies’ capital structure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller, henceforth MM, (1958), affirms that 
the financing structure is irrelevant to the company´s value, establishing, from this 
proposition, the basis of the modern theory of capital structure – the ratio between 
financial leverage and equity. Such statement presupposes a perfect world in which 
no attritions such as taxes exist. After criticism of their assumptions, MM (1963) 
review the premise of the nonexistence of taxes for the legal entity and they 
complement the previous statement. They recognize that the tax benefits on debt 
increase the company´s value, indicating that companies should pursue a higher 
degree of leverage. The existence of tax benefit on debts, in turn, is related to the 
traditional theory which states that there is an optimal capital structure. According to 
Durand (1952), it is possible to define an optimal capital structure enabling 
maximization of shareholder´s wealth. Empirically, companies tend to behave as if 
there is an optimal structure, however, since the pioneering work by Durand (1952), 
the determinant factors for such remains an open matter (Barclay, Heitzman and 
Smith, 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2015a; 2015b; Thalassinos and Stamatopoulos, 
2015).  
 
According to Chod and Zhou (2013), the introduction of interest payments 
deductibility creates an advantage for financing by means of debt rather than equity. 
Clemente-Almendros and Sogorb-Mira (2017) consider that the debt tax benefits are 
the tax savings resulting from the interest deduction from taxable incomes. When 
deducting interest, the company reduces its tax liabilities at the corporate marginal 
tax rate. Some empirical studies, including Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), find no influence of taxes on the capital structure. Based on this, in his well-
known presidential speech at the American Finance Association, Myers (1984) 
declares that he wonders how corporations define their capital structures, since there 
is no study which clearly demonstrates what predictable and material effects are on 
their debt policy. However, more recent papers by Fan, Titman and Twite (2012), 
Faccio and Xu (2015), establish a solid statistical connection between taxes and 
capital structure. 
 
A firm's optimal debt ratio is usually viewed as determined by a tradeoff between 
costs and borrowing benefits, holding the firm's assets and investment plans constant 
(Ugurlu et al., 2014). The firm is portrayed as balancing the value of interest tax 
shields against various costs of bankruptcy or financial constraints. There is 
controversy about how valuable the tax shields are, and which, if any, of the costs of 
financial constraints are material. Nevertheless, these disagreements give only 
variations on a theme. According to Myers (1984), Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) and 
Li, Whited and Wu (2016), a firm is supposed to substitute debt for equity and vice 
versa, until the firm´s value is maximized. In the current scenario of strong 
commercial competition, managers have been using global business platforms - with 
different levels of taxation - as a strategy for value creation (Tian, 2018). To make 
companies more competitive, executives attempt to optimize tax benefit through 
   Peter Vaz da Fonseca1, Michele Nascimento Jucá, Wilson Toshiro Nakamura  
 
37  
indebtedness. In this context, Brazil, as an emerging country, has particular 
characteristics that could make it play a relevant role in the international market, 
based on its competitive advantages.  
 
When considering the high taxation level of companies in Brazil, direct taxes have 
an evident significant influence on their capital structures (Locatelli, Nasser & 
Mesquita, 2015). According to Pessôa, Muniz da Silva and Abreu Campanário 
(2011), the Brazilian tax burden is one of the main variables that prevent resuming 
investment growth in the country. Oliveira and Gonçalves (2015) consider that taxes 
are a key concern of executive officers because they increase companies´ costs 
hence reducing profits, which directly affects their competitiveness in the market. 
Studies conducted in other countries, regarding trade-off theory (TOT), indicate a 
positive relationship between the level of indebtedness and the tax benefit, obtained 
by using variables and proxies, including: a) the marginal tax rate (MTR); b) kink 
(KI); and c) tax payment (TP) - For details on these variables, see Heider and 
Ljungqvist (2015); Hebous and Ruf (2017) on MTR; Graham (2000); Bartholdy and 
Mateus (2011), on KI; Devereux, Maffini and Jing (2015); Faccio and Xu (2015), on 
TP. Moreover, some Brazilian papers considering only the effective tax paid present 
positive results for this relationship (Choi, Saito, & Silva, 2015; Martinez & Martins, 
2016). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to verify whether tax benefit deriving 
from debts has a positive effect on Brazilian companies´ financial leverage.  
 
This paper differs from the existing literature by considering variables and tax 
proxies that, far as is known, have not yet been tested in emerging market, including 
MTR and KI at the same time. Thus, the main hypothesis is that tax benefits 
encourage the use of third-party capital. A sample of 259 nonfinancial companies is 
analyzed by using a regression with dynamic panel data and GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments) estimator in the attempt of eliminating endogeneity problem, 
as further discussed in Equation 3. The annual data are obtained from the Standard 
and Poor's (S&P) IQ Capital database, for the period 2008-2018. The results 
confirmed the proposed hypothesis of the tax benefit arising from debts affecting the 
companies´ capital structure. Additionally, Brazilian companies are verified as 
adopting a conservative stance at the use of their debts, to capture the benefits of tax 
deductions. According to Graham (2000), a KI greater than one is characterized as a 
conservative position, at which the company does not optimize its level of leverage, 
leaving room for improved use of this resource. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Graham, Leary and Roberts (2015) consider that companies’ capital structure is one 
of the most important topics in corporate finance theory. In particular, this refers to 
the way companies finance their assets when using equity, which represents the 
resources provided by the shareholders, or the capital of third parties, which are the 
resources obtained through debt. The seminal studies on capital structure originated 
in the 1950´s. There are two major opposing theories - the traditional theory (Durand 
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1952) and the propositions by MM (1958). Durand (1952) considers that there is an 
optimal combination of indebtedness and equity maximizing the company´s value. 
According to the traditional theory, the capital structure influences this value, 
because the cost of third-party capital is altered depending on the risk presented by 
the company. In other words, risk increases as the company increases its debt. MM 
(1958) disagree with the position by Durand (1952). Their propositions state, first, 
that the company’s value is a function of its real assets, regardless of the origin of 
the financing that makes such investments feasible, and second, that the expected 
return of a share is positively related to the indebtedness degree, because the risk to 
shareholders grows with debt. However, these propositions are built on assumptions, 
especially on the existence of perfect capital markets and the absence of taxes on 
company ´s incomes. In 1963, MM reviewed the reality of their assumptions 
regarding tax and began to consider the financing tax advantages through debt. 
 
Subsequently, new theories were derived from these seminal papers and from the 
process of questioning the assumptions on which MM’s propositions were based. 
These new theories pointed to new relations influencing the capital structure, 
including trade-off theory (TOT), pecking order theory (POT), information 
asymmetry, bankruptcy costs and agency theory. The hypotheses in this paper are 
based on these theories regarding the determinants of capital structure. According to 
Miller (1977) and Myers (1984), TOT shows the existence of an optimal level of 
indebtedness reached by companies as a result of a balance between tax benefits and 
debt costs. In this theory, tax benefits encourage the use of third-party capital 
(hypothesis 1 - hereafter H1) and debt costs result from the probability of a 
company’s default, which may occur as a result of greater indebtedness.  
 
For Li, Whited and Wu (2016), TOT is constituted from the combination of tax 
savings, debt use and bankruptcy costs, deriving from the companies´ indebtedness 
process. POT by Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, Wright and Beekhuisen (1974), proposes 
companies preferring to finance spending from their own sources. Thus, firms with 
lower growth potential should not hold debt, assuming that internally generated 
resources are sufficient to finance existing growth opportunities. Bartholdy and 
Mateus (2011), consider that POT indicates that more profitable companies (PR) 
contract less debt, because profit is used as the financing first source. In contrast, 
less-profitable companies end up by holding debt to finance their projects. Similarly, 
the most profitable companies (PY) seek less for third-party capital, because they 
can finance their spending with internally generated funds.  
 
The theory of information asymmetry proposes that capital structure decisions are 
taken in the context of imbalance between the information held by the company and 
those held by investors (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). For Miller (1977) 
and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), given a certain level of indebtedness, the debt tax 
benefit is nullified by the increased risk of bankruptcy. Altman (1968) develops a 
forecast model, known as Z-Score, to assess the probability of corporate bankruptcy. 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) find a negative correlation between Altman´s Z-Score 
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(ZA) and the indebtedness levels. According to these authors, if bankruptcy is 
expensive, then the amount of debt should be a decreasing function of the 
bankruptcy probability.  
 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2003) study the influence of corporate taxes on capital 
structure in a country where bank financing is the main external source of financing. 
The target capital structure adjustment model is studied with a sample of 929 
Portuguese companies, from 1992 to 1999. There is statistical significance between 
the tax benefit of debt and the existence of deferred taxes, with influence on the 
company ´s capital structure. In particular, a 10% increase in the marginal tax rate 
leads to a 1.36% increase in long-term bank loans. Campos and Nakamura (2015) 
use a sample of US companies to estimate the medians of 64 sectors through a 
balanced panel over a 20-year period. The marginal tax independent variable (MTR) 
is the proxy developed by Graham (1996a; 1996b), which considers the marginal 
effect prior to financing decisions to avoid endogeneity problems.  
 
According to the authors, the results - statistically significant - present a positive 
relationship between MTR and Altman's Z-Score with indebtedness. Devereux et al. 
(2015) examine how corporate capital structure is affected by the corporate income 
tax system and by the identification strategy, based on the variation of corporate 
marginal tax rates, due to the existence of kinks in the corporate tax rate schedule. 
The study sample covers a universe of 16,124 companies presenting income tax 
statement in UK, with 93,259 annual observations, during the period from 2001 to 
2010. The authors use balance sheet information to construct the leverage ratio, 
defined as the sum of short and long-term debt, expressed as a proportion of total 
debt to book value. Through a dynamic capital structure adjustment model, they find 
a positive and statistically significant long-term fiscal effect on companies' financial 
leverage. For them, companies adapt their capital structures gradually in response to 
changes in the marginal tax rate.  
 
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) investigate changes in corporate income tax in US 
states and conclude that taxes have a first order effect on capital structure. The result 
is consistent with dynamic TOT and, according to the authors, the effect is 
asymmetric, as leverage does not respond to tax cuts. Fiscal sensitivity is higher 
among profitable companies with investment grade which, respectively, has a higher 
marginal tax benefit and lower marginal cost of debt issuance. Their study is 
conducted through a natural experiment between 1989 and 2011. According to the 
authors, companies replace debt with equity when tax rates rise. On the other hand, 
they keep leverage unchanged when tax rates are lowered. This asymmetry favors 
dynamic TOT models. The authors find statistical significance for the variables 
marginal tax and size in relation to indebtedness.  
 
As far as profit taxation in Brazil is concerned, according to Godoi, Catarino, Melo 
and Garcia (2017), companies opt for a taxation regime that can be based on real 
profit, presumed profit, arbitrated profit or the simplified taxation system. The real 
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profit regime is mandatory for companies with annual revenues exceeding US$ 
38.51 million, based on their net income for the year (Law no.12,814/2013). This 
regime allows the interest deductibility on indebtedness, i.e., the tax benefit (Decree 
no. 3,000/1999).  Tax is calculated based on earnings before income tax (EBT), 
adjusted by additions, exclusions and compensations. Based on this result, on 
taxable profit incises the specified percentages of corporate taxes, which may be as 
high as 34%, the maximum statutory income tax rate in Brazil (Oliveira and 
Gonçalves, 2015). Zani, Leites and Macagnan (2014) study the influence of interest 
on equity, as a tax benefit, on the capital structure of Brazilian companies, as it can 
be considered as financial expenses and is deductible for corporate tax purposes. 
They analyze 370 publicly traded companies from various industries through panel 
data, over the period from 1998 to 2006. According to the authors, companies that 
pay interest on equity use less capital from third parties. Lara and Mesquista (2008) 
investigate 70 companies from 1995 to 1998 and 1999 and 2001 and find no 
deterministic relationship between interest on equity and Brazilian companies´ 
capital structure. 
 
3. Methodological Procedures 
 
The main hypothesis of this work is whether there is a positive relationship between 
the tax benefit of debt and corporate indebtedness. This hypothesis is divided into 
three parts relating to each variable or tax proxy, so that hypotheses H1a, H1b and 
H1c correspond to MTR, KI, and TP.  Then, additional control variables contribute 
to determine the equilibrium of the model. These hypotheses are verified by a 
regression model, using unbalanced dynamic panel data, as shown in Equation 3.  
 
The initial sample was composed of 499 Brazilian nonfinancial corporations. From 
these, 132 foreign companies were excluded for being funded by Brazilian 
depositary receipts. Other 28 companies were excluded because their levels of 
indebtedness exceeded their total assets, so they accumulated losses. Finally, 80 
companies were excluded for insufficient data in the examined period. Thus, the 
final sample consists of 259 public companies, resulting in 2,189 observations 
between the years of 2008 and 2018. The year of 2008 was selected as the starting 
date for the analysis because it marks the commencement of Law no. 11,638/07, 
which harmonizes Brazilian accounting policies with International Financial 
Reporting Standards. Data are obtained from S&P´s IQ Capital database and are 
analyzed by using Stata econometric software, version 15. 
 
The proxies associated with debt tax benefit or the independent variables are MTR, 
KI, and TP. The calculation of MTR incorporates the effects of deductions and tax 
credits. If a company has extra debt tax benefits, sufficient to lower its expected 
MTR, then the company issues less debt than does an identical company without 
these benefits. Recent studies identify some of the companies referring to the 
expected average tax rate, when making capital structure decisions, rather than the 
official tax rate (Graham et al., 2015). Graham (1996b) considers that, although 
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being difficult to calculate, the simulated tax rate used by Shevlin (1990) and 
Graham (1996a) is the best available proxy for the "true" MTR. However, if the 
simulated tax rate is unavailable, a trichotomous variable should be calculated in 
preference to the most commonly used tax variables (Graham 1996b). This paper 
uses a trichotomous variable, which is obtained on: i) the maximum statutory income 
tax rate of Brazilian companies (34%), if the company has no deferred tax or 
negative taxable income; ii) half the maximum statutory income tax rate (17%), if 
the company has either deferred tax or negative taxable income, but not both; and iii) 
a zero rate (0%), if the company has negative taxable income and deferred tax 
(Graham, 1996b).  
 
KI is a tax variable that allows determining whether companies use debt as a tax 
benefit. In some studies, it is used as a tax variable to analyze its effect on 
companies´ indebtedness levels (Graham, 2000; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2011). 
Companies with positive earnings after interest payments can raise their debt level 
and, with interest payments, achieve marginal tax benefits equal to the nominal tax 
rate. However, for companies with negative earnings after interest payments, the 
marginal benefits of a debt increase are lower than the statutory rate (Graham, 2000). 
To measure these effects, the KI variable is used, i.e., the amount of interest required 
to make earnings equal to zero. If KI is less than one, the profit before taxes is less 
than interest actually paid. In this case, the profit after interest is negative. This 
represents an aggressive indebtedness policy. However, if KI is greater than one, the 
profit after interest is positive and the company uses debt more conservatively. 
According to Graham (2000), the KI variable is the result of the ratio between 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and the interest paid on debts, as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between debt marginal tax benefit and kink 
(Statutory Tax Rate)
M
ar
g
in
al
 T
ax
 B
en
ef
it Amount of interest required
to make EBT =0
>
Actual Interest Expense
Amount of interest required
to make EBT=0
=
Actual Interest Expense
Amount of interest required
to make EBT=0
<
Actual Interest Expense
Kink > 1 Kink = 1 Kink < 1  
Source: From “Debt and Taxes For Private Firms” by Bartholdy and Mateus, 2011, 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 20(3), p. 182. 
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Notes: 
Kink = 1 if target interest = actual interest. 
Kink < 1 if EBT < interest paid. This is an aggressive policy. 
Kink > 1 if EBT > interest paid. This is a conservative policy. 
Following Graham (2000), the KI is calculated as shown in Equation 1. Interest paid is 
equal to interest expenses paid in the period. 
 
 
(1) 
 
Figure 2 further clarifies this concept using a numerical example based on the 
average values of this sample. When EBIT is equal to US$ 530 million and interest 
paid is US$ 157 million, the KI value is 3.36 (530/157), i.e., KI is greater than one. 
In this case, the tax benefit leveraged by companies is US$ 53 million (US$ 157 
million times the tax rate of 34%). This indicates that Brazilian companies currently 
adopt a conservative policy. They could increase their debt cost up to 236% by 
paying additional interest of US$ 373 million – associated with US$ 127 million tax 
- to obtain the maximum tax deduction benefit, thus achieving a KI equal to one 
(530/530). In this circumstance, the maximum possible tax benefit for companies is 
US$ 180 million (US$ 530 million times the 34% tax rate). However, if the interest 
paid exceeds US$ 530 million, that is, if it is above EBIT, KI becomes greater than 
one. 
  
Figure 2. Numerical example of the relationship between the debt marginal tax 
benefit and the kink of the Brazilian companies in the sample (US$ million).  
 
 
According to Graham (2000), a company with these values can take on more debts 
and maximize its tax benefit. Finally, following Graham (2000), the variable for the 
TP level is calculated as shown in Equation 2:  
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(2) 
 
 
According to Devereux et al. (2015), the results found in the literature provide 
evidence that firms adapt their capital structure in response to changes in their tax 
rate over time and, therefore, it is more appropriate to estimate a model of capital 
structure adjustment. The regression model with dynamic panel is characterized by 
considering the inclusion of the dependent variable, as a regressed lag, which is 
obtained using Equation 3 (Wooldridge, 2016),  where is the debt level of firm i 
at time t;  is the target adjustment coefficient;  is the constant term;  is the 
estimated coefficient for tax variables;  is the tax variable;  is the estimated 
coefficient of control variables;  is the vector of control variables and  is the 
term of error. The model variables are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
(3) 
 
Table 1. Variables of the econometric model 
I
n
it
ia
ls 
Hy
p 
Name 
Type of 
variabl
e 
The
-
ory 
E
xp
.  
Si
gn 
 
Formula 
Components 
L  
Debt  
level 
Depend
ent 
n.a. 
n.
a. 
L = Debt/Total  
assets 
Debt = short and long term 
debts 
Assets = total assets 
 
M
T
R 
 
H1
a 
 
Marginal 
tax rate 
 
Indepen
-dent 
 
TO
T 
 
+ 
 
MTR = 
Trichotomous 
proxy, whose 
assigned value can 
be 0%, 17% or 
34% 
i) maximum statutory tax 
rate (34%), if company has 
no deferred tax or negative 
taxable income; 
ii) half the maximum 
statutory tax rate (17%), if 
company has deferred tax or 
negative taxable income, but 
not both; and, 
iii) zero (0%), if company 
has negative taxable income 
and deferred tax. 
 
K
I 
 
H1
b 
 
Kink 
 
Indepen
-dent 
 
TO
T 
 
- 
 
KI = EBIT/Interest 
paid 
EBIT = earnings before 
interest and taxes                                            
Interest paid = interest 
expenses paid in the period 
T
P 
H1
c 
Tax 
Payment 
Indepen
-dent 
TO
T 
+ 
 
TP = Paid value of 
taxes/ EBT 
 
Paid value = paid values of 
corporate taxes 
EBT = earnings before taxes 
P
Y 
n.a
. 
Profitabil
ity (yield) 
Control 
PO
T 
- PY = EBIT / Assets 
EBIT = earnings before 
interest and taxes 
Assets = total assets 
       NI = net income for the 
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P
R 
n.a
. 
Profitabil
ity 
Control PO
T 
- PR = NI / Sales period 
Sales = total sales for the 
period 
T
Q 
n.a
. 
Tobin´s 
Q 
Control 
PO
T 
+ TQ = TL / MV 
MV – Maket value 
TL= total liabilities 
MV= Market value 
 
Z
A 
 
n.a
. 
 
Z-Score 
Altman 
 
Control 
 
Ban
k 
rupt
cy 
 
- 
 
Z = (1.2*X1) + 
(1.4*X2) + 
(3.3*X3) + 
(0.6*X4) + (1*X5) 
X1 = working capital  / total 
assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total 
assets 
X3 = EBIT / total assets 
X4 = market value of equity 
/ book value of demanded 
liabilities 
X5 = sales / total assets 
I
E 
n.a
. 
 
Interest 
on equity 
Control 
PO
T 
- 
IE = IE payment 
Dummy 
Where: 
0 = if company pays  no  
interest on equity 
1 = if company pays  interest 
on equity 
Notes. n.a. = non applicable.  TOT denotes trade-off theory and POT denotes 
pecking order theory 
  
4. Analysis of Results 
 
Table 2 describes the main characteristics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables relating to the main hypothesis. The Brazilian companies have an average 
L value of 0.29. Average KI of 3.36 indicates that companies can increase tax 
deductions of interest expenses. Doing so, kink value would equal to one, which 
characterizes the debt tax optimization (as shown in Figure 1).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variables Observation
s 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximu
m 
L 2308 0.29 0.18   0.00   0.82 
MTR 2308 18.43 9.95   0.00 34.00 
KI 1870 3.36 2,75   0.39 10.39 
TP 1709 0.24 0.11   0.01 0.50 
PY 2306 0.08 0.08 -0.56 0.88 
PR 2287 0.12 0.50 -4.72 3.98 
QT 2291 1.51 1.08   0.34 8.67 
ZA 2206 2.32 1.75 -1.90 9.97 
IE 2307 0.42 0.49  0.00 1.00 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and 
control variables: L is the general indebtedness ratio calculated as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets; MTR is a tax proxy whose assigned value can be 0%, 17% or 
34%; KI is the ratio of EBIT to interest paid; TP is the ratio of paid value of taxes to 
EBT; PY is the ratio of EBIT to total assets; PR is the ratio of net income for the 
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period to total sales for the period; TQ (Tobin Q) is the ratio of total liabilities to 
market value; ZA is Z-Score of Altman; IE is the interest on equity calculated thru a 
proxy where 0 = if company pays no interest on equity and 1 = if company pays 
interest on equity. 
 
Table 3 presents the regression model´s results using dynamic panel data. The values 
in square brackets represent the p-values or significance levels of coefficients. Four 
models are generated, as follow: model 1, which includes all independent tax 
variables, MTR, KI, and TP; model 2, including only MTR; model 3, which includes 
only KI; and model 4, including only TP. Regarding the dynamic panel assumptions 
tests, the Sargan test points to the null hypothesis acceptance that the instrumental 
variables (IV) are valid. According to Roberts and Whited (2013), IV try to 
eliminate the endogeneity by dropping the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term. In turn, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test verifies the 
existence of serial correlation. The result points to the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis that there is a first-order serial correlation (p-value 0.0000) and a 
rejection of the same null hypothesis for the second order serial correlation. These 
results support the validation of all models (1-4) of the dynamic panels tested. The 
estimation through the Blundell and Bond (1998)´s system GMM allows to 
dynamically measure the system by reducing the effects of the variables omitted 
from dynamic equations (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). 
 
To test robustness: i) Results of dynamic panel models are compared with static 
panel. In line with the literature, better models are generated in dynamic panel, 
suggesting that firms adapt their capital structure in response to changes in their 
marginal tax rate over time; ii) The models of the dynamic and static panels of the 
Brazilian companies are compared with the companies of Chile - important 
emerging country of Latin America and producer of commodities such as Brazil. 
The results confirm the conservative use of the tax benefit by Brazilian companies. 
 
Concerning the independent tax variables at level, all proxies presented statistical 
significance at the 1% level. MTR presents the expected positive relation with the 
indebtedness variable, for models 1 and 2. In turn, KI presents the expected negative 
relation with the indebtedness variable for models 1 and 3. In the case of TP, the 
positive sign has a statistical significance for models 1 and 4. These results indicate 
that the debt tax benefits effectively influence the companies´ capital structure, 
confirming the main hypothesis (H1) of this study. The lagged dependent variable 
(Lt-1) shows a positive sign and a statistical significance at the 1% level for all 
models. The high coefficient of the indebtedness lagged variable suggests a 
prolonged adjustment phase for Brazilian companies´ capital structure, i.e., past debt 
has a high degree of influence on current debt. It can be confirmed by the Speed of 
Adjustment (SOA) – from ʎ 13.7% to ʎ 21.6%. SOA determines the relevance of 
dynamic TOT (Frydenberg, 2011). Research on capital structure adjustment speed is 
an important issue to be researched. (Huang and Ritter, 2009).The lagged 
independent tax variables aim at verifying the existence of a relationship between 
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the current indebtedness and its values in the immediately preceding period. 
Consideration of the dynamic element allows controlling for the possible correlation 
existence between the independent variable´s past values and its contemporary 
values, thus eliminating potential sources of bias among these estimators. In this 
way, the first-difference lagged variables can be used as instruments for the level 
equation. The MTR´s lagged tax variables have a positive sign, being consistent with 
theory, and are statistically significant for models 1, 2, and 4. These results confirm 
the main hypothesis (H1) of this study. In addition, it is noted that the KI and TP tax 
variables experience a sign reversal when switching between the level variables and 
their lagged ones – with statistical significance at the 1% level - related to the 
general and specific models of each. This fact suggests the existence of a short-term 
adequacy dynamics of 1 year in relation to the capital structure. 
 
Concerning the level control variables, in the case of PY, the positive relation is 
significant for all models at the 1% level. This result suggests that Brazilian 
companies define their capital structure based on TOT. QT has a positive relation, 
being significant at the 1% level only for model 4. ZA shows a negative relation and 
is statistically significant at 1% level for all models. IE has a negative relation with 
indebtedness and statistical significance for all models at the 1% level, what suggests 
that high profit companies take advantage of the Brazilian taxation law. 
 
Table 3. Regression with dynamic panel data 
Variable
s 
Hypothese
s 
Expect sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Lt-1 
n.a 
+ 
0.7924  
[0.000] 
0.8101 
 [0.000] 
0.7868  
[0.000] 
0.8630 
 [0.000] 
MTR 
H1a 
+ 
0.0006 
 [0.000] 
 0.0009 
 [0.000] 
n.a n.a 
MTRt-1 
H1a 
- 
-0.0009  
[0.000] 
-0.0001 
 [0.766] 
n.a n.a 
KI 
H1b 
- 
- 0.0102 
  [0.000] 
n.a 
-0.0093 
 [0.000] 
n.a 
KIt-1 
H1b 
+ 
0.0081  
[0.000] 
n.a 
0.0059  
[0.000] 
n.a 
TP 
H1c 
+ 
0.1667 
 [0.000] 
n.a n.a 
0.1308  
[0.000] 
TPt-1 
H1c 
- 
- 0.0360  
[0.000] 
n.a n.a 
0.0253 
[0.219] 
PY 
n.a 
+ 
0.1459 
 [0.000] 
0.1467 
 [0.002] 
0.3242 
 [0.000] 
0.2502 
 [0.000] 
PR 
n.a 
- 
- 0.0647 
 [0.000] 
0.0026  
[0.781] 
- 0.0347 
 [0.024] 
- 0.0355  
[0.005] 
QT 
n.a 
+ 
-0.0071 
 [0.000] 
0.0031  
[0.392] 
-0.0029  
[0.476] 
0.0077 
[0.016] 
ZA 
n.a 
- 
- 0.0072 
[0.000] 
- 0.0099  
[0.000] 
- 0.0068  
[0.053] 
- 0.0159  
[0.000] 
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IE 
n.a 
- 
- 0.0294  
[0.000] 
-0.0363 
[0.000] 
- 0.0244 
 [0.000] 
- 0.0360 
 [0.000] 
         ʎ                                                             
20,8%   
Prob > chi2                                                    
0.0000 
       19,0% 
0.0000 
21,6% 
0.0000 
13,7% 
0.0000 
 Sargan (p - value)                                          
0.5939 
Order 2 (p-value)                                           
0.2138 
0.2729
0.0684 
0.1659
0.5599 
0.4170 
0.1424 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: n.a = not applicable. The values in square brackets represent the level of statistical 
significance of the relation, whereas those in bold font represent the variables with statistical 
significance and the theoretically predicted sign. 
 
This table reports results from GMM regressions analyses with total leverage at time 
t as dependent variable and independent variables: MTR is a tax proxy whose 
assigned value can be 0%, 17% or 34%; MTRt-1 is the lagged MTR variable; KI is 
the ratio of EBIT to interest paid; KIt-1 is the lagged KI variable; TP is the ratio of 
paid value of taxes to EBT; TPt-1 is the lagged TP variable. The control variables are: 
PY is the ratio of EBIT to total assets; PR is the ratio of net income for the period to 
total sales for the period; TQ (Tobin Q) is the ratio of total liabilities to market 
value; ZA is Z-Score of Altman; IE is the interest on equity calculated thru a proxy 
where 0 = if company pays no interest on equity and 1 = if company pays interest on 
equity.  
 
Finally, Table 4 summarizes the results of the regression test hypotheses validity, 
using dynamic panel data. To corroborate the hypotheses of this study, a more 
conservative criterion is considered regarding the coherence of the signs with the 
theories and the statistical significance of the independent and control tax variables 
for model 1 and another specific model (2, 3, or 4). Based on this criterion, MTR, 
KI, and TP confirm the hypothesis H1 for models 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, regarding 
the research problem of this study, a positive relation between debt tax benefit and 
companies´ indebtedness is found. 
 
Table 4. Validation of the regression model test hypotheses – summary 
Variab
les 
Hypothese
s 
Theory 
Expecte
d sign 
Models of regression with 
dynamic panel data 
Confir
med         
hypothe
sis 
 1 2 3 4 
 
 
MTR H1a TOT + Yes Yes n.a n.a  Yes 
KI H1b TOT - Yes n.a Yes n.a  Yes 
TP H1c TOT + Yes n.a n.a n.a  Yes 
PY n.a TOT + Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PR n.a POT - Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
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QT n.a POT + No No No Yes No 
ZA n.a Bankruptcy - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE n.a POT - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
 Source: Authors’ camputations.  
Note: n.a = not applicable. 
 
This table reports summary from regression model test hypotheses MTR is a tax 
proxy whose assigned value can be 0%, 17% or 34%; MTRt-1 is the lagged MTR 
variable; KI is the ratio of EBIT to interest paid; KIt-1 is the lagged KI variable; TP is 
the ratio of paid value of taxes to EBT; TPt-1 is the lagged TP variable. The control 
variables are: PY is the ratio of EBIT to total assets; PR is the ratio of net income for 
the period to total sales for the period; TQ (Tobin Q) is the ratio of total liabilities to 
market value; ZA is Z-Score of Altman; IE is the interest on equity calculated thru a 
proxy where 0 = if company pays no interest on equity and 1 = if company pays 
interest on equity 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Capital structure is the most studied subject in finance, but researchers continue 
being challenged by the questioning of Myers (1984) on how firms choose their 
capital structure. Brazil faces a higher tax burden than most of its developing 
countries´ competitors. In this context, this study aims at understanding whether tax 
benefits deriving from debt affect the capital structure of Brazilian nonfinancial 
companies. The main hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between debt tax 
benefit and corporate indebtedness. To verify this hypothesis, 259 nonfinancial 
companies in Brazil are analyzed in the period from 2008 to 2018 by means of 
regression analysis with dynamic panel data. The tax proxies are MTR, KI, and TP.  
 
All proxies are found as statistically significant for all models, whether general or 
specific, with the expected sign of the theory. Regarding the independent variables, 
it is found that, for each independent variable, there is a reversal sign between the 
level variables and the lagged ones. This suggests the existence of adequacy 
dynamics of one year in relation to the capital structure. In addition, it is noted that 
Brazilian companies adopt a conservative stance at the use of their debts in capturing 
the tax deduction benefits. This result corroborates the studies by Graham and 
Tucker (2006) and Richardson, Lanis and Leung (2014).  
 
Hypothesis that tax benefits positively influence Brazilian companies´ indebtedness 
is confirmed for all models and proxies, which corroborates Choi et al. (2015) and 
Martinez and Martins (2016). MTR has statistical significance in both the general 
and the specific models.  MTR is an important proxy developed by Graham (1996a; 
1996b) to study the expectation of companies regarding the taxation of next profits 
and, thus, to better capture the relationship with indebtedness. KI shows a sign as 
predicted by the theory and it demonstrates statistical significance, both in the 
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general model 1 and in the specific model 3. Its negative relation with indebtedness 
indicates that tax benefits are a driver in contracting third-party capital. However, for 
Brazilian companies to reach the optimum point (KI = 1), they should increase their 
indebtedness by an additional up to 236% in interest payments (KI = 3.36). This 
result corroborates Faccio and Xu (2015) and Tian (2018). TP presents a sign in 
accordance with the theory and is statistically relevant in the general and specific 
models. The positive relations of these tax variables with indebtedness reinforce the 
fact that tax benefits are a driver of corporate financial leverage. This result 
corroborates the studies by Devereux et al. (2015) and Clemente-Almendros and 
Sogorb-Mira (2017). Relating to the control variables, PY, ZA, and IE comply with 
the predicted signs and are statistically significant. 
 
This paper innovates in using data in a dynamic panel, and adds to the existing 
literature by presenting new evidence, such as the speed of adjustment of the level of 
indebtedness towards an optimal capital structure target. In addition, tax proxies, not 
examined at the same time for emerging market companies, are applied in the 
research. The empirical findings are summarized as follows: a) in line with the 
previous research, taxation has a positive impact on the Brazilian companies' capital 
structure, suggesting that the tax system provides a systematic incentive for greater 
leverage; and b) despite the heavy tax burden, companies in Brazil adopt a 
conservative policy as to these tax benefits. As Graham (2000) comments, Brazilian 
companies, which are demanding the taxes reduction, are leaving money on the 
table. 
 
There are limitations in this study. First, maybe other factors influence corporate 
indebtedness, such as government incentives through the granting of subsidized 
interest credit, which would reduce the need of using the tax benefit. Second, the 
existence of distinct economic scenarios, such as growth and crisis, is not considered 
and the model does not include macroeconomic variables. Third, this sample of 
companies comprises publicly traded companies, of which there is a reduced number 
in Brazil (499 companies).  
 
It would be useful to understand the unlisted companies´ capital decision, given their 
increasingly important role in the economy.  Finally, a number of issues could be 
considered in future research, as follows: a) marginal tax rate calculation, i.e., 
application of  Graham´s simulated model (1996a, 1996b, 2000, 2003); b) 
comparisons of different company samples – e.g., large and medium/small sized 
companies or national and international ones - to analyze the tax benefit effect on 
their capital structures; c) understanding the influence of tax incentives, which could 
replace debt tax benefits on the level of companies´ financial leverage; and, d) 
analysis of  the tax benefit relationship relating to the short-term and long-term 
indebtedness.  
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